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Abstract—In this talk we describe our content-preserving
attack on object detectors, ShapeShifter [1], and demonstrate
how to evaluate this threat in realistic scenarios. We describe
how we use CARLA [2], a realistic urban driving simulator, to
create these scenarios, and how we use ShapeShifter to generate
content-preserving attacks against those scenarios.
Index Terms—Adversarial attack, Object detection, CARLA
I. INTRODUCTION
Most adversarial machine learning research focuses on
indistinguishable perturbations while few focus on more re-
alistic threats like content-preserving perturbations and non-
suspicious inputs [3]. Although some research does focus on
these more realistic threats [4], they are often limited to the
classification task even though many safety- and security-
critical systems need to localize, in addition to classify, objects.
These systems often perceive the physical world with sensors,
and most attacks do not account for the characteristics of
this sensing pipeline and thus fail to remain adversarial when
physically realized.
II. OUR SHAPESHIFTER ATTACK
Our recent work, ShapeShifter [1], creates content-
preserving physically-realizable adversarial stop signs that are
mis-detected as other objects by the Faster R-CNN Inception-
v2 object detector trained on the MS-COCO dataset. More
recently, we showed how to make this attack an accessory [5]
by limiting the perturbation to the printable area of a t-shirt
as shown in Figure 1.
To create these attacks, we first had to digitally craft them,
then physically fabricate them, and finally test them in the real
world. This process is straightforward assuming one knows
how to accurately model these real-world transformations
that Expectation over Transformation [6] requires, a method
ShapeShifter relies upon. More often there was a non-trivial
amount of iteration between crafting, fabricating, and test-
ing. Additionally, choosing how to perturb objects that are
realistically and physically constrained (e.g., attackers cannot
typically perturb the sky or even all parts of the object in non-
suspicious ways) took some consideration. Our experience has
led us to seek means to reduce these difficulties.
III. THE CARLA SIMULATOR
CARLA is an open-source realistic driving simulator. It
provides a convenient way to train autonomous driving agents
with a variety of different sensor suites (cameras, LIDAR,
depth, etc.), and test them in realistic traffic scenarios. We
can reduce the time between digitally crafting a perturbation
and testing it against real scenarios by using CARLA as a
simulator of the real-world. In some cases, we have found
our attacks already work in CARLA as shown in Figure 2.
CARLA has also enabled us to craft new perturbations that
were previously difficult to model as shown in Figure 3. The
reproducibility of the CARLA scenarios enables us to better
understand the efficacy of our attacks across a variety of
environmental conditions that CARLA already supports.
Our purpose in creating these attacks and evaluating them
under realistic scenarios is to understand whether adversarial
examples pose a real threat to real systems. While it is true
that current adversaries might use easier means to subvert
these systems (e.g., by knocking over a stop sign), we should
not underestimate what methods attackers will undertake to
achieve their means.
We also believe the creation of these realistic evaluations
will increase our defensive capabilities. To date it is unclear
whether the most successful defense, adversarial training [7],
can even scale to ShapeShifter-style perturbations. A more
recent defense has shown some defensive capability against
ShapeShifter-like attacks on image classifiers [8]. However,
neither of these defenses think about the system as a whole. By
creating these realistic evaluations in CARLA, defenders can
think more holistically about potential strategies. For example,
CARLA enables us to quickly experiment with different
sensing modes. We have found that the depth channel might
provide some defensive capability against pixel perturbations
when the object of interest has a distinct shape as shown in
Figure 4. From a system-level perspective, perhaps this is an
acceptable defense, because now the attacker must now perturb
the geometry of the object in addition to its color.
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Fig. 1. An accessorized [5] t-shirt created by our ShapeShifter attack [1]
causes the object detector to see a bird rather than a person. The person on
the left is correctly detected with 99% confidence, while the on the right with
the accessorized t-shirt on is mis-detected as a bird with 98% confidence. We
set the detection threshold at 50%. Faces anonymized.
Fig. 2. We transferred the attack onto the CARLA pedestrian model. The
perturbation remained adversarial for a limited set of camera positions and
orientations. The pedestrian model is incorrectly detected as a bird with 98%
confidence.
Fig. 3. CARLA enables us to perturb the environment with realistic con-
straints. We created full t-shirt perturbation that is adversarial from different
camera positions and orientations. The pedestrian model is mis-detected as a
bird with 94% confidence at a further distance than the transferred perturbation
in Figure 2.
Fig. 4. In autonomous driving systems, there is reason to believe adversarial
examples like ours can be mitigated using multi-modal sensing. Here we
show an off-the-shelf object detector detecteing a stop sign using only the
depth channel. CARLA enables us to quickly test and prototype these kind
of defenses.
